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ABSTRACT 
  Many proponents of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines envisioned 
a system in which a politically insulated agency would craft guidelines 
based on empirical study. This vision of the now-advisory Guidelines 
survives in Supreme Court opinions that appear to accept that the 
work of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the agency tasked with 
formulating the Guidelines, is driven largely by empirical analysis. 
This vision has created uncertainty, however, about how much 
deference courts should show particular Guidelines—such as Section 
2G2.2, the Guideline applicable to possession of child pornography—
that do not reflect empirical study by the Commission, but that have 
instead been shaped by aggressive congressional intervention in the 
Commission’s policymaking process. This Note suggests an approach 
under which the level of judicial deference owed to a congressionally 
amended Guideline depends on the extent to which that Guideline 
reflects the institutional strengths or weaknesses of Congress. 
Applying this approach to Section 2G2.2, the Note argues that district 
courts should be willing to impose below-Guidelines sentences for 
possession of child pornography when they conclude that the 
applicable Guideline is too harsh. Although the child pornography 
Guideline warrants some deference as a product of democratic 
processes, the exercise of independent judgment by district courts can 
impose a useful check on institutional pathologies that afflict 
congressional sentencing policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
District court judges are increasingly unwilling to follow the 
advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines1 when imposing sentences for 
possession of child pornography. In 2009, they issued below-
Guidelines sentences in 43 percent of the cases governed by Section 
2G2.2,2 the Guideline for child pornography possession, compared 
with 15.9 percent of all cases.3 Many district judges have apparently 
concluded not only that Section 2G2.2 is too harsh,4 but also that it 
warrants little deference—that they should be free to favor their own 
judgment over the policy choices embodied in that Guideline.5 
Although the merits of the Guideline for child pornography 
possession have been extensively debated,6 the related issue of how 
much deference courts owe to that Guideline also requires careful 
attention. This issue is complicated by that Guideline’s provenance. 
Reformers who led the push for the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
 
 1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2010). 
 2. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 
2009, at 14 tbl.5 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sc_cases/USSC_2009_Quarter_Report_
Final.pdf (showing the number of cases governed by Section 2G2.2 in which district courts 
imposed sentences within, above, and below the Guidelines range). These figures do not include 
government-sponsored below-Guidelines sentences. 
 3. Id. at 1 tbl.1. Preliminary data for 2010 reinforce this pattern. The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s preliminary third-quarter report shows below-Guidelines sentences in 43.8 
percent of the cases governed by Section 2G2.2, see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY 
QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: 3RD QUARTER RELEASE 14 tbl.5 (2010), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/sc_cases/USSC_2010_Quarter_Report_3rd.pdf, compared with 17.6 percent of all 
cases, id. at 1 tbl.1.  
 4. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
JUDGES: JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010, pt. III, tbl.8 (2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Judge_Survey/2010/JudgeSurvey_201006.pdf (finding that 70 percent of 
district judges surveyed believe the Guidelines range for possession of child pornography is too 
high). 
 5. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 6. For criticism of the child pornography Guideline, see generally Lynn Adelman & Jon 
Deitrich, Improving the Guidelines Through Critical Evaluation: An Important New Role for 
District Courts, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 575, 584–85 (2009); Jesse P. Basbaum, Note, Inequitable 
Sentencing for Possession of Child Pornography: A Failure to Distinguish Voyeurs from 
Pederasts, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1281 (2010); and Troy Stabenow, Deconstructing the Myth of 
Careful Study: A Primer on the Flawed Progression of the Child Pornography Guidelines, ODS 
TRAINING BRANCH (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/child porn july revision.pdf. For a 
discussion of the controversy surrounding the child pornography Guideline, see generally Mark 
Hansen, A Reluctant Rebellion, A.B.A. J., June 2009, at 54. For a defense of the Guideline, see 
generally Alexandra Gelber, Response to “A Reluctant Rebellion,” DEPARTMENT OF JUST.: 
CHILD EXPLOITATION & OBSCENITY SEC. (July 1, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/
ReluctantRebellionResponse.pdf. 
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originally hoped they would reflect the expertise of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission (Commission), the agency established to 
promulgate the Guidelines.7 The child pornography Guideline, 
however, has been amended numerous times at the express direction 
of Congress.8 Thus, to decide how much judicial deference the 
Guideline warrants, one must determine how much deference is owed 
to a Guideline that reflects express congressional policy choices 
rather than the Commission’s expertise.9 
This Note advances the discussion of the child pornography 
Guideline by addressing that larger issue. Although many district 
courts have assumed that only the Commission’s expertise can justify 
deference to the Guidelines,10 this Note argues that when the 
Guidelines embody explicit congressional preferences, courts should 
consider not only the absence of the Commission’s expertise, but also 
how the Guidelines reflect the institutional strengths or weaknesses 
of Congress. Courts should acknowledge Congress’s democratic 
legitimacy and capacity for deliberation.11 Courts should also remain 
alert, however, to the influence of interest-group politics and 
majoritarian pressures—influences that often skew congressional 
policymaking toward unwarranted severity.12 
This approach recognizes that, in some cases, even Guidelines 
that do not reflect the Commission’s expertise may warrant significant 
deference. This Note concludes, however, that the child pornography 
Guideline does not present such a case. Even if the general values 
underlying congressional amendments to that Guideline warrant 
some weight, courts should be willing to impose below-Guidelines 
sentences when they conclude that the child pornography Guideline 
is too severe.13 
 
 7. See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective 
on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1991) (discussing the reasons 
for Congress’s initial delegation of policymaking authority to the Commission through the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.)). 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. For a discussion of the ways in which some courts have approached this issue, see infra 
Part II.B. 
 10. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 11. See infra Part III.A. 
 12. See infra Part III.B. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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Part I provides background on the federal Guidelines system. 
Part II introduces the Guideline for possession of child pornography, 
explaining how it operates and showing how Congress has influenced 
its development. It then critiques approaches some courts have taken 
to the special problem this Guideline poses as an embodiment of 
congressional policy choices. Part III outlines an alternative approach 
that takes into account the institutional strengths and weaknesses 
manifested in Guidelines that result from congressional intervention. 
Finally, Part IV applies this approach to the child pornography 
Guideline. Part IV concludes that because of Congress’s susceptibility 
to interest-group pressures and majoritarian anxieties, this Guideline 
reflects an institutional perspective skewed in favor of unnecessary 
harshness—a perspective that courts can usefully counterbalance. 
I.  THE FEDERAL GUIDELINES SYSTEM 
This Part provides background on the federal sentencing system. 
It first describes the Guidelines system established by the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).14 It then discusses the changes wrought 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker.15 
A.  The Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines 
Before the SRA, sentencing courts enjoyed broad and essentially 
unreviewable discretion to impose sentences within wide statutory 
ranges.16 Under a system geared toward rehabilitation, the sentencing 
court set a minimum and maximum for a defendant’s prison term, 
leaving parole officials to determine, within those limits, when the 
defendant was sufficiently rehabilitated to leave prison.17 Based 
primarily on concerns about the sentencing disparity that this system 
allowed,18 the SRA eliminated parole19 and created the  
 
 14. SRA, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 15. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 16. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225–26 (1993). 
 17. Id. at 226–27; see also Ilene H. Nagel, Foreword: Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The 
New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 894–95 (1990) 
(observing that under the pre-SRA rehabilitative model of sentencing, “Congress set the 
maximum penalty, the judge imposed a sentence from the appropriate range, and parole 
officials determined the actual length of imprisonment”). 
 18. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 65 (1984) (“The shameful disparity in criminal sentences is a 
major flaw in the existing criminal justice system, and makes it clear that the system is ripe for 
WOODLEE IN FINAL 12/29/2010  5:32:42 PM 
2011] CHILD PORNOGRAPHY SENTENCING 1019 
Commission.20 Although the SRA prescribed the general goals for the 
federal sentencing system,21 it delegated the task of formulating more-
detailed rules—the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—to the 
Commission.22 Sentencing-reform advocates hoped that this 
delegation would neutralize political pressures for unnecessarily 
harsh penalties and ensure that federal sentencing policy would 
reflect more-careful study than Congress could devote.23 
According to a Commission report on the initial version of the 
Guidelines, the Commission used an empirical analysis of past 
sentencing practices as a starting point and then “accepted, modified, 
or rationalized” those practices to formulate the Guidelines.24 
Although the Supreme Court has apparently accepted this account of 
the Commission’s policymaking process,25 many scholars have argued 
 
reform.”). For a thorough discussion of the legislative history and political context of the SRA, 
see generally Stith & Koh, supra note 16. 
 19. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2006) (providing that “[a] prisoner shall be released by the 
Bureau of Prisons on the date of the expiration of his term of imprisonment, less any time 
credited toward the service of his sentence” because of his compliance with the prison’s 
disciplinary regulations); see also Mark Osler, Policy, Uniformity, Discretion, and Congress’s 
Sentencing Acid Trip, 2009 BYU L. REV. 293, 308–09 (discussing the implications of the SRA’s 
elimination of parole). 
 20. SRA § 217, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2006) (establishing the Commission and defining its 
purposes and responsibilities); see also Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of 
Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 93, 97–98 (1999) (describing the roles of Congress, the Commission, and the courts under 
the institutional framework established by the SRA). 
 21. Berman, supra note 20, at 97; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (prescribing the factors to be 
considered by the district court in imposing a sentence); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (prescribing the factors 
to be considered by the Commission in promulgating the Guidelines). 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 994. 
 23. See Wright, supra note 7, at 8–11 (discussing reasons for the SRA’s delegation of 
policymaking authority to the Commission). 
 24. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 16 (1987), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/
Supplementary Report.pdf; see also id. at 16–23 (describing the data and analytical methods 
used by the Commission). The Commission chose this approach to avoid the challenge of 
agreeing on a coherent penological theory to guide sentencing policy. Id. at 15–16. For criticism 
of this decision, see, for example, Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 
438–43 (1992); and see also Andrew von Hirsch, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Do They 
Provide Principled Guidance?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 367, 370–71 (1989). 
 25. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2464 (2007) (emphasizing the “empirical 
approach” that the Commission purportedly used to formulate the Guidelines); see also Carissa 
Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. 
REV. 717, 726 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s reasoning in Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. 
Ct. 558 (2007)—that district courts should have more freedom to deviate from Guidelines that 
do not reflect the Commission’s ordinary expertise—rests on the inaccurate assumption that 
most of the Guidelines reflect empirical analysis). 
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that the Guidelines reflect numerous poorly explained deviations 
from past practice, often resulting from attempts to harmonize the 
Guidelines with mandatory minimums or congressional directives.26 
Under the Guidelines, judges determine sentences using a grid 
called the Sentencing Table.27 Each box in the grid contains a range of 
sentences; within each range, the longest sentence is 25 percent longer 
than the shortest.28 The appropriate box is selected by calculating the 
offense level, a y-axis variable that measures the severity of the 
offender’s conduct, and the criminal history category, an x-axis 
variable that reflects the offender’s conviction record.29 To calculate 
the offense level, a court identifies the base offense level, which is 
determined by the crime of conviction,30 and adjusts it based on 
specific offense characteristics prescribed for each offense31 and 
adjustments applicable to all offenses.32 
In addition to creating an agency to promulgate the Guidelines, 
the SRA further regulated sentencing decisions through directives to 
district courts.33 One, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), requires the 
court to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, 
to comply with the purposes” of sentencing: retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.34 This overarching command is 
often called the “parsimony provision.”35 Section 3553(a) also 
 
 26. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 60–66 (1998) (criticizing the Guidelines’ deviations 
from past practice); Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: 
Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
19, 33–35 (2003) (explaining why the Guidelines deviate from past practice and characterizing 
them as “an amalgam of empirical results and explicit or implicit policy choices”). 
 27. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 26, at 3; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (2010) (providing the Sentencing Table for calculating 
sentence ranges under the Guidelines). 
 28. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 26, at 3. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(a)(1) (2010) (prescribing a 
base offense level of eighteen if the defendant is convicted of certain child pornography 
offenses). 
 31. See, e.g., id. § 2G2.2(b)(4) (prescribing a four-level increase for a child pornography 
offender whose crime involved sadomasochistic or violent images). 
 32. See, e.g., id. § 3A1.1 (prescribing offense level adjustments based on characteristics of 
the victim). 
 33. E.g., SRA § 212(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006). 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 35. E.g., Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin’ Heart(land): The Long Search 
for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723, 745 (1999) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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requires the sentencing court to “consider” other factors, such as “the 
nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities,” and the Guidelines range for the 
offense.36 This provision seems to treat the Guidelines as advisory.37 
But another directive, which, as explained in the next Section, has 
been invalidated, required the court to “impose a sentence of the 
kind, and within the range,” specified by the Guidelines, except in 
certain narrow circumstances.38 This provision, § 3553(b)(1),39 made 
the Guidelines effectively mandatory.40 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Advisory Guidelines Jurisprudence 
In United States v. Booker, however, the Supreme Court 
invalidated § 3553(b)(1) to reconcile the system with recently 
developed Sixth Amendment doctrine.41 Under Apprendi v. New 
Jersey42 and Blakely v. Washington,43 a jury must find any fact, other 
than a prior conviction, that is necessary to raise the penalty above 
the maximum permitted based on the jury verdict alone.44 Booker 
applied this principle to the federal Guidelines. The Court held that 
the sentencing system was inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment 
because judicial fact findings were necessary to apply specific offense 
 
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 37. See Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 749, 776 (2006) (observing that the language of § 3553(a) “seems to suggest . . . that 
a judge might decline to impose a guidelines sentence in a particular case if the judge 
determined that the guidelines sentence was inconsistent with the statutory purposes of 
sentencing”). 
 38. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 
(2005). 
 39. This provision was originally codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). It became § 3553(b)(1), 
however, when the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, created new 
provisions under § 3553(b). Id. § 401(a), 117 Stat. at 667–68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553 (2006)).  
 40. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–34; see also O’Hear, supra note 37, at 776–77 (observing that 
“the SRA contemplated mandatory guidelines” but noting the ambiguity created by the 
apparently conflicting directives in § 3553(a) and § 3553(b)). 
 41. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
 42. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 43. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 44. Id. at 303 (“[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or 
admitted by the defendant.”); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (“[A]ny fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury.”). 
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characteristics or adjustments that raised the Guidelines range 
beyond the range authorized by a guilty verdict.45 
To correct the Sixth Amendment violation, in a separate 
remedial opinion signed by a different majority, the Court invalidated 
§ 3553(b)(1), the provision of the SRA that made the Guidelines 
effectively mandatory.46 After Booker, § 3553(a) still requires district 
courts to consider the Guidelines range.47 But because the Guidelines 
are no longer mandatory,48 no judicial finding of fact is necessary to 
increase a sentence above the range authorized by the Guidelines 
based on the jury verdict.49 A more natural remedy might have been 
to require juries to find any facts supporting a specific offense 
characteristic or adjustment.50 The remedial majority concluded, 
however, that preserving judicial fact finding within a discretionary 
system would be more consistent with Congress’s intent in 
establishing the Guidelines system.51 Notably, the Court also 
invalidated the provision prescribing the standard for appellate 
review of sentences, reasoning that the provision presupposed 
mandatory Guidelines.52 In its place, the Court established a 
deferential form of appellate review for “unreasonableness.”53 The 
 
 45. Booker, 543 U.S. at 235. 
 46. See id. at 245–46 (severing and excising 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e), and 
observing that § 3553(a), a surviving SRA provision, requires a sentencing court to consult the 
Guidelines but “permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as 
well”). 
 47. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2006) (requiring district courts to consider the 
range recommended by the Guidelines when imposing sentences). 
 48. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
 49. Cf. id. at 233 (noting that advisory Guidelines would not pose a constitutional problem 
and reaffirming the Court’s holding in Apprendi and Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), 
that judges may constitutionally “exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a 
statutory range”). 
 50. Commentators have not failed to notice the irony in remedying a Sixth Amendment 
violation by increasing the power of judges, rather than juries. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, 
Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 345 (2006) 
(“[T]o culminate a jurisprudence seemingly seeking to vindicate the role of the jury in modern 
sentencing systems, Booker devised a remedy which ultimately gave federal judges new and 
expanded sentencing powers.”). 
 51. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246 (reasoning that only preserving extensive judicial fact finding 
would “maintain[] a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender’s real 
conduct—a connection important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress 
intended its Guidelines system to achieve”); see also id. at 254 (“[T]he sentencing statutes, read 
to include the Court’s Sixth Amendment requirement, would create a system far more complex 
than Congress could have intended.”). 
 52. Id. at 259. 
 53. Id. at 264. 
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Court would later clarify in Gall v. United States54 that sentences 
should be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.55 
Since Booker, the Court has struggled to define the role of the 
Guidelines and the breadth of district courts’ sentencing discretion.56 
When wrestling with these issues, the Court has suggested that the 
Commission’s expertise justifies some limits on district courts’ 
discretion to deviate from the Guidelines.57 Significantly, the Court’s 
decision in Kimbrough v. United States58 suggests, as an apparent 
corollary, that those purportedly exceptional59 Guidelines that do not 
reflect the Commission’s expertise warrant relatively little 
deference.60 
In Kimbrough, the Court held that district courts could deviate 
from the drug-trafficking Guidelines based on a disagreement with 
the Commission’s decision to treat any amount of crack cocaine as 
equivalent to 100 times as much powder cocaine.61 The key premise of 
 
 54. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007). 
 55. Id. at 594. 
 56. Sentencing always begins with the calculation of the defendant’s Guidelines range, id. 
at 596, but how much that range should influence a district court’s final sentencing decision is 
open to some debate. For a discussion of how some courts have approached this question when 
the applicable Guideline reflects express congressional policy choices, see infra Part II.B. For a 
proposed alternative approach, see infra Part III. 
 57. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 (2007) (suggesting that because of 
the Commission’s expertise and capacity for empirical study, “closer review may be in order 
when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidelines based solely on the judge’s view that the 
Guidelines range ‘fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations’ even in a mine-run case” 
(quoting Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007))); Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594, 597 
(suggesting that because the Guidelines are “the product of careful study based on extensive 
empirical evidence,” a more significant deviation from the Guidelines requires a stronger 
justification); Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464–65 (invoking the Commission’s “empirical approach” as a 
justification for an appellate presumption that within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable, a 
device that would tend to encourage district courts to adhere to the Guidelines). 
 58. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007). 
 59. For criticism of the notion that the Guidelines by and large reflect the Commission’s 
expertise and empirical study, see, for example, STITH & CABRANES, supra note 26, at 60–66; 
and see also Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 26, at 33–35. 
 60. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574–75 (suggesting that a district court should have 
greater freedom to deviate from the Guidelines based on its own view that they are too severe 
when the Guidelines “do not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic 
institutional role”). 
 61. See id. at 564 (holding that “the Court of Appeals erred in holding the crack/powder 
disparity effectively mandatory”); see also Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843 (2009) 
(per curiam) (clarifying that “the point of Kimbrough” was “a recognition of district courts’ 
authority to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreement with them, 
and not simply based on an individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in 
a particular case”). 
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this holding was that the 100-to-1 ratio did not reflect the 
Commission’s “characteristic institutional role.”62 Because the 
Guidelines typically reflect empirical analysis, the Court noted, 
appellate review should ordinarily be more searching when a district 
court deviates from the Guidelines simply because it disagrees with 
them than when a court deviates because the Guidelines are a poor fit 
for an unusual case.63 The Guidelines’ treatment of crack cocaine, 
however, did not reflect the Commission’s expertise.64 Rather, it 
reflected the Commission’s attempt to harmonize the Guidelines with 
statutory minimums and maximums that adopted the same ratio.65 
Because the 100-to-1 ratio did not manifest the Commission’s unique 
strengths, district courts could more readily reject it. 
Notably, the Kimbrough Court did not decide what sort of 
deference courts owe to clear congressional policy choices expressed 
through the Guidelines. Although the government argued that the 
100-to-1 ratio was a “specific policy determinatio[n]” by Congress and 
therefore beyond district courts’ discretion to reject,66 the Court 
concluded that the 100-to-1 ratio could not be attributed to a 
congressional policy judgment: Congress had expressed a preference 
only for certain minimums and maximums, not for a specific ratio that 
should govern all sentences within those limits.67 
II.  THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF THE CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINE 
The Guideline for possession of child pornography raises an 
issue the Court has never explicitly addressed: after Booker, how 
much should district courts defer to Guidelines that embody explicit 
congressional policy choices? Kimbrough is suggestive. Like the 100-
to-1 ratio at issue in Kimbrough,68 the child pornography Guideline 
does not reflect the expertise of the Commission. As this Part shows, 
numerous specific congressional directives have left little room for 
empirical analysis to guide the Commission’s policymaking.69 Yet 
 
 62. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575. 
 63. Id. at 574–75. 
 64. Id. at 575. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 570 (alteration in original). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 61–65. 
 69. See infra Part II.A. 
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Kimbrough is not directly on point. Because of those specific 
congressional directives, most provisions of the child pornography 
Guideline embody the unequivocally expressed will of Congress. As 
previously explained, Kimbrough does not settle what degree of 
deference courts owe to explicit congressional policy choices 
embedded in the Guidelines.70 
This Part introduces the unique problem posed by congressional 
policy choices embedded in the child pornography Guideline. It first 
describes Congress’s role in shaping that Guideline. It then considers 
how courts have approached the problem of determining how much 
deference is due in applying that Guideline. 
A.  The History and Substance of the Child Pornography Guideline 
Although the SRA originally delegated the details of federal 
sentencing policy to the Commission,71 Congress has in many cases 
reclaimed that power by directing the Commission to make specified 
amendments to the Guidelines.72 The child pornography Guideline, in 
particular, is notable for the pervasiveness of congressional influence. 
As both the Commission and Troy Stabenow, an Assistant Federal 
Public Defender and critic of the Guideline, have documented,73 the 
Guideline for possession of child pornography has been amended 
numerous times, often at the behest of Congress.74 This history reveals 
 
 70. See supra text accompanying notes 66–67. 
 71. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of 
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1491 (2008) (noting that there have been “hundreds of 
amendments to the original Guidelines, most of which increased penalties at the express 
direction of Congress”). For lists of congressional directives to the Commission, see generally 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF 
SENTENCING REFORM app. B (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year_
study_full.pdf; Congressional Directives to Sentencing Commission: 1988–2009, ODS TRAINING 
BRANCH (June 2010), http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/congressional directives.pdf. 
 73. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/20091030_
History_Child_Pornography_Guidelines.pdf (describing in detail the history of the child 
pornography Guideline); Stabenow, supra note 6, at 3–22 (describing the history of the child 
pornography Guideline and criticizing it as the product of irrational political posturing). 
 74. See, e.g., Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(i), 117 Stat. 650, 672 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note (2006)) (amending the Guidelines directly to create an 
enhancement based on the number of images); Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 
1995 (SCACPA), Pub. L. No. 104-71, §§ 2–3, 109 Stat. 774, 774 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 994 note) (requiring the Commission to increase the base offense level for child 
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that the child pornography Guideline expresses clear congressional 
preferences. 
Early incarnations of the child pornography Guideline were 
driven by the Commission’s autonomous policy decisions.75 Before 
possession of child pornography was a federal crime, Section 2G2.2 
applied only to trafficking and receipt of child pornography, and it 
prescribed a base offense level of thirteen.76 Distribution of child 
pornography triggered an increase of five or more levels, depending 
on the retail value of the material distributed.77 Images of children 
under twelve triggered a two-level increase.78 Soon after the 
promulgation of the original Guidelines, the Commission expanded 
the two-level enhancement to include images of prepubescent 
children79 and added a four-level enhancement for sadomasochistic or 
violent images.80 
In 1990, when Congress criminalized the possession of child 
pornography,81 the Commission proposed a separate Guideline for 
possession and receipt, leaving Section 2G2.2 to govern only 
trafficking cases.82 The new Guideline, Section 2G2.4, would have 
prescribed a base offense level of only ten for possession and receipt.83 
 
pornography offenses and create a two-level enhancement for offenses involving the use of a 
computer); Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1992, Pub. 
L. No. 102-141, § 632, 105 Stat. 834, 876 (1991) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note) 
(requiring the Commission to raise the base offense level for child pornography offenses). 
 75. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 73, at 10–16 (describing how the 
Commission shaped Section 2G2.2 before Congress began to intervene). 
 76. Id. at 10 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (1987)). 
 77. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (1987) (prescribing 
specific offense characteristics for distribution and receipt of child pornography). 
 78. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 73, at 10; see also U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (1987) (prescribing specific offense characteristics for 
distribution and receipt of child pornography). 
 79. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 73, at 12 (citing Notice of Submission of 
Regular Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary to the Congress for 
Review, 53 Fed. Reg. 15,530 (Apr. 29, 1988)). 
 80. Id. at 16; see also Notice of Submission of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines to 
Congress, 55 Fed. Reg. 19,188, 19,198 (May 8, 1990) (amending Section 2G2.2 to include an 
enhancement for sadistic, masochistic, or otherwise violent images). 
 81. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 73, at 17 (citing Crime Control Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 323(a)–(b), 104 Stat. 4789, 4818–19 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252 (2006))). 
 82. Id. at 18–19 (citing Notice of Submission of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 
to Congress, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,762 (May 16, 1991)). 
 83. Notice of Submission of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines to Congress, 56 
Fed. Reg. at 22,770. 
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Responding to a perceived attempt to reduce penalties for child 
pornography offenders, Congress asserted control. In 1991, while 
most senators were occupied by committee meetings, Senators Jesse 
Helms and Strom Thurmond introduced an amendment to an 
appropriations bill that made several demands of the Commission, 
including, most notably, the following: continue to group receipt of 
child pornography with trafficking under Section 2G2.2, raise the 
base offense level under Section 2G2.2 to at least fifteen, raise the 
base offense level under Section 2G2.4 to at least thirteen, and create 
a five-level enhancement under Section 2G2.2 “for offenders who 
have engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or 
exploitation of a minor.”84 Senator Helms emphasized that his 
amendment was supported by the Department of Justice (DOJ), as 
well as by religious and anti-pornography groups.85 As a letter 
inserted into the record of the House debate shows, the Commission 
opposed grouping receipt with trafficking under Section 2G2.2.86 The 
Helms-Thurmond Amendment passed, however, and the Commission 
amended the Guidelines to comply with its directives.87 
In 1995, Congress enacted the Sex Crimes Against Children 
Prevention Act of 1995 (SCACPA).88 Through SCACPA, Congress 
ordered the Commission to raise base offense levels for child 
pornography offenses by at least two levels and to create a two-level 
enhancement for computer use.89 No congressional committee held 
any hearings on the bill.90 Every member of Congress who made a 
statement in the floor debate supported penalty increases.91 The bill’s 
 
 84. 137 CONG. REC. 18,897–98 (1991) (reprinting the amendment as introduced during 
consideration of the appropriations bill); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 73, at 20; 
Stabenow, supra note 6, at 6. 
 85. 137 CONG. REC. 18,898 (1991) (statement of Sen. Helms). 
 86. Letter from William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, to Edward 
R. Roybal, Chairman, Subcomm. on Treasury, Postal Serv., and Gen. Gov’t (Aug. 7, 1991), 
reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. 23,733–34 (1991); Stabenow, supra note 6, at 7. 
 87. Stabenow, supra note 6, at 8; see also Treasury, Postal Service and General 
Government Appropriations Act, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 632, 105 Stat. 834, 876 (1991) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note (2006)) (enacting the Helms-Thurmond 
Amendment into law); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amends. 435–36 (2010) 
(describing amendments to the Guidelines promulgated in response to the Helms-Thurmond 
Amendment). 
 88. SCACPA, Pub. L. No. 104-71, 109 Stat. 774 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994 
note). 
 89. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 73, at 26 (quoting SCACPA §§ 2–3). 
 90. H.R. REP. NO. 104-90, at 4 (1995). 
 91. See 141 CONG. REC. 10,977–78 (1995) (reproducing statements made in the floor 
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lone critic, Representative Zoe Lofgren, argued that it was too 
lenient.92 To comply with SCACPA, the Commission raised the base 
offense level under Section 2G2.2 from fifteen to seventeen and the 
base offense level under Section 2G2.4 from thirteen to fifteen; it also 
added a two-level enhancement for computer use to both 
Guidelines.93 
In 2003, Congress enacted the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other 
Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 
(PROTECT Act),94 a popular bill implementing an Amber Alert 
system to respond to child kidnappings95 and targeting virtual child 
pornography.96 Late in the legislative process, Representative Tom 
Feeney introduced an amendment drafted by two DOJ lawyers.97 
After twenty minutes of debate, the amendment was attached to the 
House bill.98 It was ultimately enacted in a modified form.99 No 
committee held any hearings on the amendment.100 
The most conspicuous features of the Feeney Amendment were 
its limitations on judicial authority to impose non-Guidelines 
sentences.101 These sentencing-reform provisions consumed the floor 
 
debate on SCACPA); id. at 10,278–80 (same). 
 92. 141 CONG. REC. 10,279 (1995) (statement of Rep. Lofgren). 
 93. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 73, at 27; see also Notice of Submission to 
Congress of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 20,306, 20,307 (May 6, 
1996) (implementing the changes required by SCACPA). 
 94. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18, 21, 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 95. Stabenow, supra note 6, at 20; see also PROTECT Act §§ 301–305 (establishing the 
Amber Alert program). 
 96. Stabenow, supra note 6, at 20; see also PROTECT Act § 502 (amending federal statutes 
regarding child exploitation offenses to better deal with the problem of virtual child 
pornography). 
 97. Stabenow, supra note 6, at 20; see also 149 CONG. REC. 7640–43 (2003) (introducing the 
Feeney Amendment); Skye Phillips, Note, Protect Downward Departures: Congress and the 
Executive’s Intrusion into Judicial Independence, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 947, 983 & n.185 (2004) (citing 
Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Ashcroft Intensifies Campaign Against Soft Sentences by Judges, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at A1) (noting the Feeney Amendment’s origin in the DOJ). 
 98. Stabenow, supra note 6, at 20 (citing Phillips, supra note 97, at 983); see also 149 CONG. 
REC. 7643 (2003) (allowing twenty minutes for the floor debate on the Feeney Amendment). 
 99. See PROTECT Act § 401 (enacting a modified version of the Feeney Amendment); see 
also Stabenow, supra note 6, at 20–21 (describing the Feeney Amendment’s progress through 
the House and Senate). 
 100. 149 CONG. REC. 9347–48 (2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 101. 149 CONG. REC. 7640–41 (2003); see also Mark Osler, Uniformity and Traditional 
Sentencing Goals in the Age of Feeney, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 253, 254 (2004) (characterizing the 
Feeney Amendment as a “mad rush to further restrict judicial discretion” and noting that “[t]he 
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debate102 and provoked opposition by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States (Judicial Conference) and the Commission.103 Less 
noticed were provisions that directly amended the Guidelines to 
increase the penalties for child pornography offenses.104 These 
provisions created an enhancement based on the number of images, 
as well as a four-level enhancement under Section 2G2.4 for 
possession of sadomasochistic or violent images.105 
Subsequently, the Commission consolidated Sections 2G2.2 and 
2G2.4 into a single Guideline because of the perceived similarity of 
the offenses of possession and receipt.106 To harmonize this Guideline 
with a newly enacted five-year mandatory minimum for trafficking 
and receipt of child pornography,107 the Commission also raised the 
base offense levels for possession and receipt to eighteen and twenty-
two, respectively.108 
Under the resulting Guideline, Section 2G2.2, a first-time 
offender convicted of possession of child pornography faces a base 
offense level of eighteen109 and a Guidelines range of twenty-seven to 
 
Feeney Amendment was enacted to limit downward departures by barring some previously-
allowable departures, establishing de novo appellate review of departures, prohibiting the 
Sentencing Commission from adding any new grounds of downward departure for two years, 
and directing the Sentencing Commission to amend the Guidelines to ensure that the number of 
downward departures are [sic] ‘substantially reduced’”). 
 102. See 149 CONG. REC. 7643–45 (2003) (reproducing the House debate about the Feeney 
Amendment); 149 CONG. REC. 9346–51, 9353–58, 9360–66 (2003) (reproducing the Senate 
debate about the Feeney Amendment). 
 103. See 149 CONG. REC. 9351–52 (2003) (reproducing letters expressing the objections of 
the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Commission). 
 104. Stabenow, supra note 6, at 21; see also PROTECT Act § 401(i)(B) (enacting a direct 
amendment to the Guidelines for child pornography offenses). 
 105. PROTECT Act § 401(i)(B). 
 106. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 73, at 42–43; see also Notice of Submission to 
Congress of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines Effective November 1, 2004, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 28,994, 29,003 (May 19, 2004) (consolidating Sections 2G2.2 and 2G2.4). 
 107. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 73, at 44. 
 108. See id. at 49 (showing amendments to Section 2G2.2); see also Notice of Submission to 
Congress of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines Effective November 1, 2004, 69 Fed. 
Reg. at 29,003 (increasing the base offense levels for possession and receipt of child 
pornography). 
 109. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(a)(1) (2010). The base offense level 
for trafficking or receipt is twenty-two, id. § 2G2.2(a)(2), but is reduced to twenty for simple 
receipt, id. § 2G2.2(b)(1). Though possession and simple receipt have different base offense 
levels, they are otherwise treated similarly by the Guidelines. See id. § 2G2.2(b) (enumerating 
the same specific offense characteristics for both offenses). For simplicity’s sake, this Note 
focuses on possession. 
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thirty-three months.110 In most cases, however, a number of specific 
offense characteristics increase the offense level, resulting in a higher 
range. One enhancement, applicable in 94.8 percent of the cases 
sentenced under Section 2G2.2 in 2009,111 raises the offense level by 
two if the images portray a victim who is prepubescent or under the 
age of twelve.112 As a result of Congress’s directives to the 
Commission in SCACPA,113 another enhancement, applicable in 97.2 
percent of the cases,114 raises the offense level by two if the offense 
involved the use of a computer.115 Together, these enhancements 
result in an offense level of twenty-two and increase a first-time 
offender’s Guidelines range to forty-one to fifty-one months.116 
As a result of the direct congressional amendments to the 
Guidelines in the PROTECT Act,117 Section 2G2.2 also prescribes an 
enhancement of two to five levels based on the number of images 
involved.118 If the offense involved ten or more images, the increase is 
two levels;119 if it involved six hundred or more images, the offense 
level is increased by five levels.120 Assuming the enhancements for 
computer use and the age of the victim also apply,121 the five-level 
enhancement, applicable in 63.1 percent of the cases in 2009,122 results 
in an offense level of twenty-seven and raises a first-time offender’s 
Guidelines range to seventy to eighty-seven months.123 
 
 110. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. 
 111. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, USE OF GUIDELINES AND SPECIFIC OFFENSE 
CHARACTERISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 36 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/gl_freq/
09_glinexgline.pdf. 
 112. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(2). 
 113. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text. 
 114. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 111, at 37. 
 115. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(6). 
 116. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. 
 117. See supra notes 94–105 and accompanying text. 
 118. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(7). 
 119. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(A). 
 120. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D). 
 121. Recall that these enhancements almost always apply. See supra notes 111–15 and 
accompanying text. 
 122. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 111, at 37. 
 123. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. 
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Also as a result of the PROTECT Act,124 possession of images 
portraying “sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of 
violence” triggers a four-level enhancement,125 which applied in 73.4 
percent of the cases sentenced under Section 2G2.2 in 2009.126 
Assuming the enhancements based on computer use and the age of 
the victim also apply, this enhancement results in an offense level of 
twenty-six and raises a first-time offender’s Guidelines range to sixty-
three to seventy-eight months.127 Adding the common five-level 
enhancement for possession of six hundred or more images yields an 
offense level of thirty-one and a range of 108 to 135 months,128 subject 
to the statutory maximum of 120 months.129 
Finally, as a result of the Helms-Thurmond Amendment,130 a less 
common enhancement, applicable in only 9.2 percent of cases,131 
increases the offense level by five “[i]f the defendant engaged in a 
pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a 
minor.”132 Added to the enhancements based on computer use and the 
age of the victim, this enhancement results in an offense level of 
twenty-seven and yields a range of seventy to eighty-seven months.133 
 
 124. Although the Commission had previously promulgated an enhancement for violent 
images under the Guideline for distribution and receipt of child pornography, see supra note 80 
and accompanying text, the PROTECT Act amended Section 2G2.4, the Guideline for 
possession, to include such an enhancement, see supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
 125. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(4). 
 126. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 111, at 37. 
 127. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (2006). 
 130. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 131. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 111, at 37. 
 132. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(5). 
 133. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. Because Section 2G2.2 applies not only to possession of 
child pornography but also to trafficking and receipt, see id. app. A (providing that all offenses 
defined under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 are to be sentenced under Section 2G2.2), it also provides 
enhancements for distribution of child pornography for various purposes, see id. § 2G2.2(b)(3) 
(prescribing, at a minimum, a two-level offense level increase for distribution, with five- to 
seven-level increases for more pernicious circumstances). Because the distribution 
enhancements seem to target transportation, distribution, or sale offenses criminalized under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1)–(3), rather than possession, this Note does not dwell on the distribution 
enhancements. 
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B.  Lower Courts’ Responses to Congressional Policy Choices 
Embedded in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
1. Congressional Directives as Mere Meddling.  Because the child 
pornography Guideline reflects extensive congressional intervention 
rather than the Commission’s empirical analysis, many district courts 
have concluded that this Guideline warrants little or no deference.134 
They appear to have taken the view that only the Commission’s 
expertise can justify deference to the Guidelines.135 Kimbrough’s 
suggestion that the Guidelines warrant the greatest respect when they 
reflect the Commission’s “characteristic institutional role”136 does lend 
support to this view. 
But the history of the child pornography Guideline complicates 
any attempt to apply Kimbrough straightforwardly. In Kimbrough, 
the Court concluded that the 100-to-1 ratio could not be attributed to 
any clear expression of congressional preference.137 The child 
pornography Guideline, on the other hand, results largely from 
specific congressional directives and even direct congressional 
 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (N.D. Iowa 2009) 
(concluding that the Guideline for child pornography offenses warrants little deference 
“because it is the result of congressional mandates, rather than the Commission’s exercise of its 
institutional expertise and empirical analysis”); United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 
1009 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (concluding that the child pornography Guideline warrants little 
deference because the “respect [owed to the Guidelines] will be greatest where the Commission 
has satisfied its institutional role of relying on evidence and study to develop sound sentencing 
practices”); United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 895 (D. Neb. 2008) (“Because the [child 
pornography] Guidelines do not reflect the Commission’s unique institutional strengths, the 
court affords them less deference than it would to empirically-grounded guidelines.”); see also 
Hessick, supra note 25, at 731 (“A number of district courts have concluded ‘that the child-
pornography guidelines’ lack of empirical support provides sentencing judges the discretion to 
sentence below those guidelines based on policy disagreements with them.’” (quoting United 
States v. Huffstatler, 561 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2009))). District Judge Lynn Adelman has also 
advocated this approach in a law review article. See Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 6, at 576 
(“The extent to which a sentencing court should accord respect to a guideline will generally 
depend on whether, when it developed the guideline, the Commission functioned as Congress 
envisioned in the [SRA]. The idea that led to the establishment of the Commission was that an 
administrative agency, insulated from politics and composed of experts on sentencing, would 
enact guidelines that advanced the generally accepted purposes of sentencing (punishment, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), eliminated sentencing disparity, and were 
regarded by participants in the sentencing process as fair and just.” (footnote omitted)); see also 
id. at 584–85 (arguing that the child pornography Guideline warrants little deference because it 
is “based largely on congressional actions” instead of “Commission research or expertise”). 
 135. See supra note 134. 
 136. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007). 
 137. See id. at 570–74 (discussing and rejecting the government’s argument that the 100-to-1 
ratio reflected the will of Congress). 
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amendments.138 In light of that fact, the assumption that, as 
Kimbrough appears to suggest,139 only the Commission’s expertise can 
justify judicial deference to the Guidelines is inappropriate. As an 
expression of congressional preferences, the child pornography 
Guideline may reflect institutional strengths of Congress. Arguably, 
Congress’s democratic legitimacy and capacity for deliberation about 
complex policy choices warrant at least some judicial deference to 
Guidelines that embody congressional preferences.140 Although 
perhaps a comparison of the institutional strengths of the courts and 
Congress would ultimately support significant judicial discretion, 
Congress’s institutional strengths are weighty enough to deserve more 
serious attention than these district courts have given them. 
2. Congressional Directives as Binding Policy Choices.  Another 
possible approach to the same general problem—an approach at one 
time advocated by the government141 and adopted by two circuits142—
 
 138. See supra Part II.A. 
 139. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574–75 (reasoning that district courts should have greater 
discretion to deviate from the 100-to-1 ratio because it does not “exemplify the Commission’s 
exercise of its characteristic institutional role”). 
 140. See infra Part III.A. 
 141. See Kimbrough, 128 S Ct. at 570 (summarizing the government’s argument that the 
courts should adhere to the 100-to-1 ratio); see also 2G2.2 REPLY TO GOVERNMENT 11 (n.d.), 
available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/2G2.2 Reply to Govt.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2010) 
(responding to the government’s argument that courts may deviate from the child pornography 
Guideline based only on individualized circumstances, not “based on policy disagreements with 
a particular guideline”). 
 142. Courts have addressed an issue similar to the special problem raised by the child 
pornography Guideline in at least one other context. The SRA directs the Commission to set 
the Guidelines for certain categories of recidivists “at or near” the statutory maximum for the 
offense of conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006). Until Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, §§ 2–3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 
844), the statutory maximums for cocaine offenses incorporated the 100-to-1 crack/powder 
ratio. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006) (amended 2010) (prescribing a maximum penalty of forty 
years in prison for manufacturing or distributing five hundred grams of powder cocaine or five 
grams of crack cocaine and a maximum penalty of life in prison for manufacturing or 
distributing five kilograms of powder cocaine or fifty grams of crack cocaine). As a result of 
these congressional policy choices, the career-offender Guideline inevitably reflected this 
disparity. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(b) (2010) (providing that a 
career offender’s offense level must be based on the statutory maximum for the offense of 
conviction). The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits once held that because, in this context, the 
disparity results from congressional policy decisions, Kimbrough does not free district courts to 
deviate from the career-offender Guideline based on a disagreement with this disparity. See 
United States v. Welton, 583 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he career offender Guideline 
range is the product of a Congressional mandate.”), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2061 (2010), and 
overruled by United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. 
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would be to accept explicit congressional policy choices embedded in 
the Guidelines as binding. Under this view, a district court could 
deviate from the Guidelines based on the presence of exceptional 
facts that made the applicable Guideline a poor fit for a particular 
case but not based on the court’s own view that congessional policy 
choices expressed through the Guidelines were unsound—for 
example, that a congressionally amended Guideline is too harsh even 
in an ordinary case or that certain enhancements are generally 
unwarranted. 
The circuits that at one time adopted this approach appear to 
have retreated from it,143 and other circuits that have addressed the 
issue have not endorsed it.144 Even so, one can imagine how the courts 
 
Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 1229 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL] 
§ 4B1.1—which was the result of ‘direct congressional expression’—is distinguishable from 
Kimbrough’s crack cocaine Guidelines, which were the result of implied congressional policy.”), 
vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010). 
 143. The Seventh Circuit has overruled its decisions adopting this approach. Corner, 598 
F.3d at 416. The Supreme Court has vacated the Eleventh Circuit case adopting this approach, 
in light of the government’s decision to abandon the position that district courts may not reject 
the crack/powder disparity reflected in the career-offender Guideline. Vazquez, 130 S. Ct. at 
1135; see also Brief for the United States at 7, Vazquez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010) 
(No. 09-5370), 2009 WL 5423929 (requesting that the Court vacate the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in light of the government’s recently adopted position that district courts may deviate 
from the career-offender Guideline based on policy disagreement with it). 
 144. See United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. 
Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221, 230 (1st Cir. 2008)) (observing that circuit precedent has interpreted 
Kimbrough to allow district courts to deviate from the Guidelines based on disagreement with 
the policies they embody “even where a guideline provision is a direct reflection of a 
congressional directive”); see also United States v. Mitchell, No. 08-50429, 2010 WL 4105220, at 
*4 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2010) (holding that district courts may deviate from the career-offender 
Guideline based on their disagreement with the crack/powder disparity it reflects); United 
States v. Michael, 576 F.3d 323, 327 (6th Cir. 2009) (same), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 819 (2009); cf. 
United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 664–65 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that Congress’s directive 
to the Commission to set the career-offender Guideline near the statutory maximum does not 
“deprive the courts of authority to impose on a career offender a prison term that is not near the 
statutory maximum,” though not explicitly deciding whether district courts may exercise that 
authority based on a categorical policy disagreement with Congress’s view that career offenders 
should ordinarily be sentenced near the maximum). Although these courts have rejected the 
view that congressional policy choices embedded in the Guidelines are binding, they appear for 
the most part to have said little else about how much weight those policy choices warrant. See 
Mitchell, 2010 WL 4105220, at *4 (declining to provide any guidance regarding the weight owed 
to congressional policies embedded in the career-offender Guideline beyond the holding that 
district courts may disagree with those policies); Michael, 576 F.3d at 327 (same); see also 
Sanchez, 517 F.3d at 668 (noting only that “[c]ongressional policy judgment[s] . . . must be taken 
into account”). But see Stone, 575 F.3d at 93 (“After Kimbrough, the law allows one judge to 
find that congressional input makes a sentence less empirical, and so less appropriate, while 
another judge may reasonably find such input makes the sentence more reflective of democratic 
judgments of culpability, and so more reasonable.”). 
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that have not yet settled the issue might be tempted by this 
approach’s strengths. This approach respects the democratic 
legitimacy of congressional policy choices embedded in the 
Guidelines.145 It also seems to acknowledge district courts’ expertise in 
more fact-bound decisions.146 Further, Kimbrough does not explicitly 
foreclose this approach. As noted previously,147 the Kimbrough Court 
did not decide whether district courts could reject explicit 
congressional policy choices expressed through the Guidelines.148 
But this approach, too, is unsatisfying. This approach is 
insensitive to—or perhaps unrealistic about—the institutional 
strengths and weaknesses of Congress, and to how the courts may 
complement them. Though faithful to the notion that district courts 
are best situated to appreciate the distinctive facts of each particular 
case,149 this approach overlooks institutional reasons to welcome some 
exercises of independent policy judgment by district courts.150 The 
next Part discusses these institutional reasons and suggests an 
approach that is more responsive to them. 
III.  A MORE PROMISING APPROACH: ACCOUNTING FOR 
CONGRESS’S INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
Both approaches discussed in Part II fail to account for 
important institutional strengths. The less deferential approach151 fails 
to account for the fact that congressional policy choices embedded in 
the Guidelines may reflect a democratic legitimacy and a capacity for 
deliberation that district courts cannot match. The more restrictive 
approach152 ignores the possibility that the institutional perspective of 
district courts may have value beyond the courts’ capacity to identify 
atypical cases. 
A better approach would be for courts to decide how much 
deference to give to congressionally amended Guidelines by making a 
 
 145. For a discussion of the importance of recognizing the democratic legitimacy of 
congressional policy choices embedded in the Guidelines, see infra Part III.A.1. 
 146. See infra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra text accompanying notes 66–67. 
 148. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 570–74 (discussing and rejecting the 
government’s argument that the 100-to-1 ratio in the Guidelines reflected the will of Congress). 
 149. See infra text accompanying note 170. 
 150. See infra Part III.B. 
 151. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 152. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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realistic assessment of the institutional strengths and weaknesses they 
reflect. To the extent that the Guidelines reflect institutional 
strengths of Congress, courts should be reluctant to reject the 
judgments they embody. But when they reflect congressional 
weaknesses—and when courts can offer a useful institutional 
perspective—courts should be more willing to rely on their own 
judgment. 
A.  Congress’s Relative Strengths 
At least two institutional strengths counsel deference to 
Guidelines that track explicit congressional preferences. First, 
Congress is more democratically legitimate than courts. Second, the 
legislative process is often more conducive to deliberation about the 
broad range of relevant information and interests at stake than is the 
judicial process. 
1. Democratic Legitimacy.  Members of Congress, who are 
subject to periodic elections,153 are more democratically accountable 
than federal judges.154 Congress may thus be more responsive to the 
need to protect the public by deterring criminal conduct and 
incapacitating offenders. 
Congress’s democratic legitimacy may also make it more 
qualified than courts to express society’s view of “the seriousness of 
the offense” and “just punishment.”155 Judicial decisionmaking may 
serve this goal less reliably, both because of its political independence 
and because it reflects the limited perspective of the sentencing judge, 
rather than a legislative compromise between competing 
constituencies.156 Congressional choices embodied in the Sentencing 
 
 153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; id. amend. XVII. 
 154. See id. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”); Stephanos 
Bibas, Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Policing Politics at Sentencing, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1371, 1388 (2009) (“Congress has democratic legitimacy; courts do not.”); cf. Jeremy 
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1391 (2006) (“The 
system of legislative elections is not perfect . . . but it is evidently superior as a matter of 
democracy and democratic values to the indirect and limited basis of democratic legitimacy for 
the judiciary. Legislators are regularly accountable to their constituents and they behave as 
though their electoral credentials were important in relation to the overall ethos of their 
participation in political decisionmaking.”). 
 155. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 156. See Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the 
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Guidelines that reflect value judgments about offenders’ just deserts 
therefore warrant considerable respect. 
Notably, however, congressional amendments to the Guidelines 
may not all warrant equal deference on this ground. A well-publicized 
amendment—or one that responds to an especially salient issue—is 
more likely to reflect the public’s values.157 Those less likely to garner 
public scrutiny are less likely to reflect the popular will, because in 
those cases legislators can deviate from public preferences with less 
concern about electoral consequences.158 Thus, a district court should 
assess the strength of a Guideline’s claim to deference on the ground 
of popular legitimacy in light of the provision’s unique content and 
history. 
2. Legislative Deliberation.  Although Congress lacks the 
expertise of an independent agency, both the Supreme Court and 
scholars have recognized that legislatures are superior to courts as 
forums for the collection and analysis of large amounts of 
information.159 For this reason, Congress may be better equipped than 
courts to make policy decisions about the deterrent value of 
 
Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1133 (2005) (“[T]o the extent 
that much of this decisionmaking requires a balancing of fundamental societal values . . . no 
single individual is likely to be able to capture and represent the range of views within the 
society.”). Arguably, even the vaunted expertise of the Commission is of comparatively little 
value to this goal of sentencing. Cf. id. at 1134 (“[B]ecause the legislature is more representative 
of the society than a sentencing commission could be, the legislature might be a better choice to 
make what are essentially broad value judgments . . . .”). As Ronald Wright has argued, “[T]he 
vision of a scientific, apolitical sentencing policy is at once appealing and naive. Values not 
susceptible of empirical verification will always dominate sentencing decisions.” Wright, supra 
note 7, at 12. 
 157. See Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy, 77 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 175, 181 (1983) (finding that government policy is more likely to accord with 
public opinion on highly salient issues). Notably, a directive that addresses an especially salient 
issue is likely to closely approximate public opinion even if the directive itself is not well 
publicized. An unpopular vote on such a directive could easily become a liability in future 
reelection campaigns. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 10 
(1990) (quoting an unnamed congressman’s expression of concern that his vote, though unlikely 
to attract notice at the time, could be used against him in a future campaign). 
 158. See ARNOLD, supra note 157, at 10–11 (suggesting that the import of “potential [public] 
preferences” is limited to “preferences which legislators believe might easily be created either 
by [interest groups] or by future challengers searching for good campaign issues”). 
 159. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 550 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665–66 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Walters v. 
Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331 n.12 (1985)); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 317 (1980); see also Bibas et al., supra note 154, at 1388 (“[C]ourts lack the 
institutional competence to make systemic policy choices.”). 
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alternative sentencing policies,160 as well as their social and budgetary 
costs.161 Further, whereas judicial decisionmaking relies heavily on 
one person’s limited perspective,162 the legislative process fosters 
compromise among the wide variety of interests at stake.163 
This legislative capacity for deliberation stands out even more in 
light of the permissive standard of appellate review developed in the 
cases that follow Booker. In practice, allowing courts to reject the 
Guidelines’ recommendations because they believe those 
recommendations to be too severe means allocating policymaking 
authority to district courts with only limited policing by appellate 
courts.164 The Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence thus departs 
from the ordinary practice of subjecting district courts’ policy 
decisions to de novo review.165 Under Gall, sentencing decisions, 
whether faithful to the Guidelines or not, are reviewed “under a 
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard”;166 an appellate court’s 
disagreement with a sentence does not justify reversal.167 
The permissiveness of appellate review supports the argument 
that district courts should often defer to the general policy choices 
reflected in the Guidelines and deviate only on the basis of more fact-
bound, individualized considerations. Although appellate courts have 
some experience making prospective decisions with broad policy 
implications,168 district courts have less opportunity to deliberate 
 
 160. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (requiring sentencing courts to consider the need for 
“adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”); Bibas et al., supra note 154, at 1388 (“Congress, 
not courts, can hear expert testimony about the dangers and harms of various crimes and the 
best ways to address them.”). 
 161. See Bibas et al., supra note 154, at 1388 (“Congress, not courts, sets budgets and has to 
balance priorities such as funding for prisons and law enforcement.”). 
 162. See Robinson & Spellman, supra note 156, at 1133 (“[N]o single individual is likely to 
be able to capture and represent the range of views within the society.”). 
 163. See id. at 1134 (noting that because legislatures are “more representative of the 
society” than are sentencing commissions, they may be better able to weigh competing 
interests). 
 164. See William Otis, Priority for a New Administration: Restore the Rule of Law in Federal 
Sentencing, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 345, 345 (2008) (arguing that in a line of cases “starting with 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, running through Booker v. United States, and ending in Gall v. United 
States and Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme Court . . . . made clear that appellate review 
of district court sentencing decisions was to be deferential, if not, for most practical purposes, 
empty” (footnotes omitted)). 
 165. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing 
Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2008). 
 166. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007). 
 167. Id. at 597. 
 168. See Cynthia K.Y. Lee, A New “Sliding Scale of Deference” Approach to Abuse of 
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about broad issues of law and policy.169 Thus, district courts generally 
command the greatest deference when their decisions focus narrowly 
on the facts of particular cases.170 
Because district courts are less institutionally equipped to engage 
in deliberative policymaking, the legislative process’s suitability for 
amassing data and balancing competing interests may counsel 
deference to Guidelines that echo the will of Congress. But not all 
such Guidelines necessarily embody these strengths. A congressional 
amendment to the Guidelines enacted after robust debate and 
extensive hearings is likely to reflect a thoughtful weighing of the 
relevant interests. One passed with little discussion or analysis, 
however, warrants less deference. Congress’s legislative agenda may 
often be too full to permit the investment of time and resources 
necessary to make carefully studied sentencing-policy decisions.171 In 
such cases, district courts’ firsthand experience with the federal 
sentencing system may put them in a better position to compare 
penalties for similar offenses or to assess whether the assumptions 
underlying sentencing policies hold true in most cases.172 
Consequently, district courts should be more reluctant to defer to 
congressional policy choices echoed in the Guidelines in the absence 
of meaningful legislative deliberation. 
 
Discretion: Appellate Review of District Court Departures Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1997) (noting that “appellate courts set forth general 
principles which lower courts must follow”). 
 169. See id. (noting that appellate judges are better able to focus on legal questions and that 
appellate decisions usually have the benefit of deliberation by a panel of judges). 
 170. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 165, at 25 (“[A]lthough courts of appeals review 
factual findings and applications of law to fact deferentially, they review purely legal 
determinations de novo.”); Lee, supra note 168, at 13 (“Appellate courts generally defer to trial 
courts on factual matters, because the trial court is thought to be more competent than the 
appellate court to assess the facts.”). Thus, a primary rationale for the discretion that district 
judges have historically enjoyed in sentencing is that they are in a better position than appellate 
courts to appreciate the nuances of particular cases. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING 
MATTERS 3 (1996) (“Until twenty-five years ago, the word ‘sentencing’ generally signified a 
slightly mysterious process which, it was all but universally agreed, involved individualized 
decisions that judges were uniquely competent to make. Sentencing laws were crafted to allow 
judges latitude to fashion penalties tailored to the circumstances of individual cases.”). 
 171. Robinson & Spellman, supra note 156, at 1134; Andrew von Hirsch, The Sentencing 
Commission’s Functions, in THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 3, 6 (1987). 
 172. Cf. Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Attacks a Law as Infringing on Judges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at A14 (“[Judges] are able to see the consequences of judicial reform 
proposals that legislative sponsors may not be in a position to see.” (quoting William Rehnquist, 
C.J., U.S. Supreme Court)). 
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B.  Congress’s Relative Weaknesses 
In spite of Congress’s institutional strengths, courts may often 
have good reasons to exercise independent judgment in sentencing. 
Congress, by institutional design, is likely to discount the principle 
underlying the parsimony provision—that punishment should be no 
greater than necessary.173 As early proponents of sentencing 
commissions warned, legislative intervention in the sentencing system 
“is likely to lead to cruel, unnecessary, and expensive increases in 
prison populations.”174 
1. Undervaluing Offenders’ Interests.  Because the interests of 
offenders are poorly represented, the political process is biased in 
favor of harsher sentences. Public choice theory predicts that, because 
of their desire for reelection, legislators will act with the goal of 
maximizing political support.175 Consequently, the legislative process 
will discount the interests of groups poorly situated to offer 
meaningful political support in the form of campaign contributions, 
canvassing, and votes.176 Because offenders are often unable to offer 
political support of any significance,177 Congress likely undervalues 
their interests.178 
 
 173. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
 174. Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 73 
GEO. L.J. 225, 233 (1984); see also Wright, supra note 7, at 8–9 (observing that early reformers 
advocated delegating authority to a sentencing commission because legislatures would be 
tempted to impose unnecessarily harsh sentences to take a popular stance). 
 175. Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market 
Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 46 (1988). 
 176. As Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner explain, under interest-group 
theory, “legislation is ‘sold’ by the legislature and ‘bought’ by the beneficiaries of the 
legislation”; “[p]ayment takes the form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of 
future favors, and sometimes outright bribes.” William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The 
Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975). 
Accordingly, legislators will tend to be deaf to the concerns of those unable to pay in this 
currency. 
 177. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 725–26 (2005). 
 178. See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public 
Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089 (1993) (arguing that because legislators “undervalue the rights of 
the accused,” courts should actively develop constitutional norms of criminal procedure). 
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As a history of legislative punitiveness179 suggests, a number of 
factors often combine to exclude offenders from the political 
process.180 Because offenders often cannot identify themselves as such 
in advance181—and because they may underestimate the risk that they 
will be caught and convicted182—they are unlikely to be motivated to 
organize lobbying efforts. A desire to avoid the reputational harm of 
being identified as, or associated with, potential criminals may also 
discourage lobbying against tough-on-crime legislation.183 
Furthermore, given the apparent correlation between criminality and 
poverty,184 campaign contributions probably do not proportionately 
represent offenders’ interests. Generally, therefore, one would expect 
little interest-group maneuvering on behalf of those most directly 
burdened by harsh sentences.185 By contrast, the DOJ engages in 
significant lobbying efforts186 and has strong incentives to seek 
increased penalties to gain leverage in plea bargaining.187 Interest 
groups representing the prison industry, crime victims, and law 
 
 179. See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How 
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 405–08 (2006) 
(describing punitive trends beginning in the 1980s); Berman, supra note 20, at 99 (describing the 
successive enactment of several federal mandatory minimum statutes in the 1980s and 1990s); cf. 
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 508 (2001) 
(“American criminal law’s historical development has borne no relation to any plausible 
normative theory—unless ‘more’ counts as a normative theory.”). 
 180. See Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political 
Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973, 1975 
(2006) (“[A]ll of the powerful political groups and the electorate have lined up on the same side: 
They all seem to support tougher sentencing laws.”). 
 181. Barkow, supra note 177, at 726. 
 182. Id.; see also Dripps, supra note 178, at 1090 (“[V]ery few people expect to commit 
crimes that come to the attention of the police.”). 
 183. Stuntz, supra note 179, at 555. 
 184. See Chien-Chieh Huang, Derek Laing & Ping Wang, Crime and Poverty: A Search-
Theoretic Approach, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 909, 910–11 (2004) (enumerating studies that 
demonstrate links between crime and market wages, unemployment, and educational 
attainment). 
 185. Those who may face “corporate criminal sanctions, such as penalties for violations of 
securities and environmental laws,” are one possible exception. Barkow, supra note 177, at 725. 
 186. See id. at 728 (“No other group comes close to [the DOJ with respect to] prosecutorial 
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enforcement officials have also successfully influenced the legislative 
process.188 
Interest-group politics aside, offenders often have little voting 
power. Those who bear the brunt of tough sentencing legislation are 
significantly outnumbered by those who stand to gain from it.189 
Moreover, criminal offenders in many jurisdictions are deprived of 
the right to vote.190 Congress thus has little incentive to attach any 
weight to their interests. For these reasons, the calculus of 
congressional policymaking can be expected to discount the harm 
caused by harsh penalties. 
2. Public Misperceptions.  On the other side of the political 
balance, public demand for increased penalties, perhaps surprisingly, 
may exaggerate the degree of punitiveness genuinely supported by 
majoritarian interests. Apart from the interest-group maneuvering 
already described, this can happen for at least two reasons. 
First, circumstances often conspire to inflate the public’s 
perception of the danger posed by crime.191 Studies have shown that 
the public consistently believes crime rates are increasing, even when 
they are not.192 The public also tends to overestimate crime rates,193 as 
 
 188. Beale, supra note 179, at 471, 472 & nn.339–40. 
 189. See von Hirsch, supra note 171, at 6 (“Many voters fear crime and criminals, and few 
convicted offenders do (or even may) vote.”); cf. Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of 
Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of 
State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 503, 529–30 (1995) (offering an analogous explanation for the 
increasing federalization of criminal law). 
 190. E.g., Berman, supra note 20, at 107. 
 191. The news media often overemphasize sensational crime stories as a cost-effective way 
of securing an audience. See Beale, supra note 179, at 422 (arguing that because of “economic 
factors,” the news media’s “coverage of crime—particularly violent crime—has increased 
dramatically, and . . . has shifted toward a tabloid style”). This practice can lead the public to 
overestimate the severity of the crime problem. Id. at 442. Public misperceptions are 
exacerbated by cognitive errors that may lead people to form inaccurate generalizations about 
the crime problem based on a few particularly salient examples. Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law 
Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing 
the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 60 (1997). For a 
discussion of how cognitive errors such as overgeneralization influence the public’s views of 
crime and criminal justice, see id. at 57–64, and see also Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, 
Crime, and Criminal Justice, 16 CRIME & JUST. 99, 121–24 (1992). 
 192. Roberts, supra note 191, at 110; see also JULIAN V. ROBERTS & MIKE HOUGH, 
UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 10–15 (2005) (suggesting that 
crime rates in several nations, including the United States, were actually falling even when 
people in those nations believed they were not). 
 193. Roberts, supra note 191, at 109. 
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well as the proportion of crimes involving violence.194 Given the 
public’s support for utilitarian goals of sentencing,195 the public’s 
exaggerated perception of the danger of crime may lead to demand 
for measures more drastic than the public would otherwise support. 
Second, the public tends to underestimate the severity of 
prevailing sentences.196 This misperception can breed public sentiment 
that sentences are inadequate even when the public, if properly 
informed, would be content to leave sentences as they are.197 
Although most Americans believe courts are too lenient198—and can 
therefore be expected to support legislative action to increase 
penalties—this attitude unreliably reflects public judgment about the 
appropriateness of sentences because the public generally has little 
idea how harshly criminals are actually treated.199 
Congress’s institutional design makes it responsive to such 
distorted public perceptions.200 A politician’s incentive is to appeal to 
 
 194. ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 192, at 12. 
 195. See id. at 9–10 (showing that 69 percent of those polled in a British study deemed the 
criminal justice system’s function of “[c]reating a society where people feel safe” to be 
“absolutely essential”). 
 196. JULIAN V. ROBERTS, LORETTA J. STALANS, DAVID INDERMAUR & MIKE HOUGH, 
PENAL POPULISM AND PUBLIC OPINION: LESSONS FROM FIVE COUNTRIES 21 (2003); see also 
Roberts, supra note 191, at 112–13 (describing studies indicating that laypersons underestimate 
prevailing sentences and are typically ignorant of statutory maximums and minimums). 
 197. See ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 196, at 21 (“Calls for harsher sentencing may 
themselves be a reaction to public perceptions that sentencing is getting more lenient . . . .”). 
 198. In 2002, two-thirds of the public believed that courts in their area did not deal harshly 
enough with criminals. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 141 tbl.2.47 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire 
eds., 2005), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t247.pdf. Throughout much of 
the 1980s and 1990s, more than 80 percent of respondents held that same belief. Id. at 140–41 
tbl.2.47. 
 199. See supra note 196. Some empirical evidence supports this explanation of public 
support for harsher penalties. In a number of studies in which judges and laypersons were asked 
to recommend sentences in particular cases, the laypersons’ favored sentences were no more 
severe than the judges’. Roberts, supra note 191, at 150. Studies such as these undermine the 
suggestion that legislative intervention is needed to bring sentences up to levels consistent with 
majoritarian values. See id. at 149 (“Contrary, perhaps, to expectation, the preponderance of 
evidence supports the view that the public are not harsher than the courts . . . .”). A study of 
British attitudes toward sentencing found that those who underestimated the use of 
imprisonment were more likely to say that sentences were too lenient. Mike Hough & Julian V. 
Roberts, Sentencing Trends in Britain: Public Knowledge and Public Opinion, 1 PUNISHMENT & 
SOC’Y 11, 17–18 (1999). This finding suggests that voters may demand harsher sentences in part 
because they underestimate the severity of prevailing sentences. 
 200. See ROBERTS & HOUGH, supra note 192, at 15 (“People tend to be overly pessimistic 
about the extent of crime problems and markedly impatient with criminal justice responses to 
these problems. Not surprisingly, these features of public opinion tend to evoke characteristic 
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the public imagination, even if the public imagination and the public 
interest have become uncoupled.201 Legislators may, in fact, stand to 
gain by further inflaming the public imagination. Acting in what 
might be called an entrepreneurial role,202 legislators may drum up 
political support by simultaneously stoking public fear of crime and 
promising to extinguish the newly kindled fire with tougher 
sentencing policies.203 Although policies adopted to respond to—or to 
manipulate—exaggerated fears of serious crime problems and 
inadequate governmental responses may resonate with the public 
mood, they may not reflect the public’s deeper values or interests. All 
these influences add up to an excessively harsh legislative approach to 
sentencing policy. 
3. The Judicial Perspective as a Counter to Congress’s Institutional 
Pathologies.  Courts, however, are well positioned to counter these 
punitive tendencies.204 Consider the first problem discussed—that 
legislatures tend to undervalue offenders’ interests. Besides enjoying 
political insulation, district judges encounter offenders as individuals: 
they are closest to the “human realities of sentencing.”205 They are 
therefore less likely than Congress to discount the harm caused by 
severe penalties.206 Furthermore, although criminal offenders may not 
get a hearing in Congress,207 their interests are represented in court by 
 
responses from politicians.”). 
 201. In the context of criminal justice issues, this phenomenon is well-recognized enough to 
have earned its own name: “penal populism,” which is defined as “the pursuit of a set of penal 
policies to win votes rather than to reduce crime rates or to promote justice.” Id. at 16. 
 202. See Macey, supra note 175, at 46 (“As an entrepreneur [the legislator] seeks to create 
groups that he can benefit, in order to receive political support from them.”). 
 203. See Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 9, 14 (1999) (suggesting that heightened public concern about crime often coincides not 
with increased crime problems but with well-publicized political initiatives purporting to be 
tough on crime); cf. KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 63 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the efforts of government 
officials in the late 1980s to draw media attention to the spread of crack cocaine and noting that 
“heightened public concern about drugs reached its zenith immediately following President 
Bush’s national address in 1989, in which he focused exclusively on the drug crisis”). 
 204. Berman, supra note 20, at 110. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. Notably, a judicial tendency to be less punitive because of this proximity to the 
individual realities of sentencing may in fact be consistent with majoritarian public values. 
Studies have found that as people are given more information about the offender and the 
offense, they become less punitive. Roberts, supra note 191, at 125–26. 
 207. See supra text accompanying notes 179–90. 
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their attorneys.208 Freeing district courts to impose below-Guidelines 
sentences when they conclude that Guidelines reflecting 
congressional policy choices are too harsh would thus counterbalance 
the punitive bias of the political process. 
The exercise of independent judgment by district courts would 
also mitigate the second problem discussed—that public 
misperceptions breed excessive support for punitive policies. District 
judges have detailed knowledge of both individual offenses and the 
criminal justice system and consequently are less prone to the 
misperceptions that lead to pressure on Congress for harsher 
sentences. The exercise of independent judgment by district judges 
thus could counter the harmful effects of public misperceptions. 
Courts should hesitate to override public preferences. But when the 
Guidelines likely reflect a distortion of public values, courts should be 
willing to temper the resulting punitiveness. 
*          *          * 
District courts should consider these institutional strengths and 
weaknesses when they decide how much deference to give to 
Guidelines that embody congressional policy choices. This approach 
allows sentencing decisions to incorporate the strengths of the 
institutions that share authority over the federal sentencing system. It 
accords congressional policies the respect they warrant. But it also 
leaves room for courts to contribute an independent judicial 
perspective. In this respect, this approach is superior both to the 
theory that congressional policy choices embedded in the Guidelines 
are always binding209 and to the assumption that only the expertise of 
the Commission can justify deference to the Guidelines.210 
 
 208. See Berman, supra note 20, at 110 (“Before rendering a sentencing judgment in any 
case, judges have the benefit of arguments from both prosecutors and defense 
attorneys . . . which should provide (at least ideally) a thoughtful and reasoned presentation of 
all the competing interests and matters at stake in a particular case.”); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory 
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 304 (1988) (“[T]here is less likely to be the same high degree 
of asymmetry of viewpoints in litigation that there routinely is in legislation. Courts generally 
have at least two parties representing opposing interests in a litigated case . . . .”). 
 209. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 210. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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IV.  APPLICATION TO THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINE 
The approach to congressionally amended Guidelines developed 
in Part III does not suggest that any single level of deference is 
appropriate for all such Guidelines. Rather, each Guideline 
attributable to congressional action demands an individualized 
assessment of the institutional strengths and weaknesses that it 
reflects. Many courts have already assessed whether the child 
pornography Guideline reflects the Commission’s institutional 
strengths.211 This Part provides a necessary supplement—an 
assessment of whether that Guideline reflects the institutional 
strengths and weaknesses of Congress. On the basis of this appraisal, 
this Part argues that courts should be willing to judge for themselves 
whether that Guideline is too harsh, rather than deferring to the 
congressional policy choices it embodies. 
A.  Congress’s Institutional Strengths and the Child 
Pornography Guideline 
1. Deliberative Decisionmaking.  The child pornography 
Guideline falls far short of the ideal of legislative deliberation. 
Measures to increase penalties for child pornography offenses 
typically have enjoyed unanimous or nearly unanimous support 
among members of Congress. In the floor debate on SCACPA, for 
instance, every member of Congress who made a statement favored 
increased penalties.212 Because such measures have faced little or no 
opposition, Congress has never had to come to grips with the 
competing interests they implicate. No opposition has forced 
Congress to think deeply about the justifications for increased 
penalties. 
Further, as Stabenow shows, proposals to increase penalties have 
often been quietly attached to unrelated bills and sneaked through 
the legislative process without any meaningful discussion—not even 
the chorus of support that greeted SCACPA. The Helms-Thurmond 
Amendment, aptly dubbed a “morality earmark” by Stabenow, was 
attached to an appropriations bill while committee business occupied 
nearly every senator.213 Similarly, the provisions of the Feeney 
 
 211. See cases cited supra note 134. 
 212. See 141 CONG. REC. 10,977–78 (1995) (recording statements made in the floor debate 
that discuss the merits of SCACPA); Id. at 10,277–81 (same). 
 213. Stabenow, supra note 6, at 6; see also 137 CONG. REC. 18,906 (1991) (statement of Sen. 
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Amendment that increased penalties for child pornography offenses 
received almost no attention in Congress. They were a relatively 
inconspicuous part of an amendment with much broader 
consequences for federal sentencing.214 As Stabenow points out, “[n]o 
research, study, body of experience, or rationale” was offered for the 
specific Guidelines amendments.215 Indeed, the Feeney Amendment 
was itself attached at the last moment to the popular Amber Alert 
bill.216 Even the Feeney Amendment’s broader sentencing-reform 
provisions were enacted without the benefit of hearings.217 
Because the child pornography Guideline reflects neither any 
hard-won compromise between competing interests nor any serious 
analysis, the legislative process’s suitability as a forum for 
deliberation does not justify deference in this context. Admittedly, 
judicial deliberation is subject to limitations of its own. Courts hear 
only the arguments made by the litigants, who may not put forth all 
relevant interests and information.218 But the child pornography 
Guideline does not reflect such careful congressional deliberation 
that district judges, who can draw on their own sentencing experience 
and the arguments of the parties, should adhere to it unquestioningly. 
2. Popular Legitimacy.  On the other hand, the child 
pornography Guideline, as a product of congressional action, bears 
the imprimatur of the popular will. Congressional amendments to 
that Guideline have sometimes passed quickly and without much 
public scrutiny.219 Still, sex crimes involving children are a highly 
 
Helms) (“Obviously I[] cannot get the yeas and nays with no other Senator on the floor. 
Everybody is in committee meetings.”). 
 214. The twenty-minute House debate on the Feeney Amendment centered on the 
provisions governing downward departures and appellate review, see 149 CONG. REC. 7643–45 
(2003) (detailing the House debate about the Feeney Amendment), as did the more extended 
debate in the Senate, see id. at 9346–51, 9353–58, 9360–66 (recording the Senate debate). 
 215. Stabenow, supra note 6, at 21. 
 216. Id. at 19–20. 
 217. 149 CONG. REC. 9347 (2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Even SCACPA, a short bill 
devoted almost exclusively to penalties for child pornography offenses, passed without any 
hearings. H.R. REP. NO. 104-90, at 2–4 (1995). 
 218. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 77 (1991) (observing that courts may not “be presented with the full 
array of policy arguments” and that the parties are not guaranteed to “argue for the policy or 
rule that is best for society”). 
 219. See Stabenow, supra note 6, at 3 (observing that most provisions of the child 
pornography Guideline result from “numerous morality earmarks, slipped into larger bills over 
the last fifteen years, often without notice, debate, or empirical study of any kind”). 
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charged issue.220 On such issues, congressional policy choices are likely 
to correspond fairly closely to public opinion.221 A vote that 
contravenes strongly held popular preferences could easily become a 
liability in the next election campaign.222 Consequently, the general 
values and concerns that animate congressional amendments to the 
child pornography Guideline warrant some weight, even if a lack of 
deliberation223 counsels against hewing to the details. 
Perhaps the best illustration is the enhancement for the use of a 
computer.224 The underlying congressional directive reflects a 
legitimate public concern that computer technology facilitates the 
dissemination of child pornography.225 Probably due to the lack of 
serious deliberation,226 however, the directive, which requires an 
enhancement whenever “a computer was used to transmit the notice 
or . . . to transport or ship the visual depiction,”227 sweeps too 
broadly.228 Presumably most people would appreciate the distinction 
between those who receive an image via email and those whose 
online behavior is, as a Commission report put it, equivalent to 
“open[ing] an adult bookstore in every city in the world.”229 Although 
the underlying public concern warrants some weight, district judges, 
who are well-positioned to assess the dangers posed by individual 
offenders’ computer use, should be wary of hewing unflinchingly to 
the broad scope of the enhancement. 
 
 220. See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 218 
(2001) (“[T]he crisis over child sex abuse has taken center stage in our culture and politics, as 
the worst of all possible evils.”). 
 221. See Page & Shapiro, supra note 157, at 181 (finding that government policy is more 
likely to accord with public opinion on highly salient issues). 
 222. See ARNOLD, supra note 157, at 10 (quoting an unnamed congressman’s expression of 
concern that his vote, though unlikely to attract notice at the time, could be used against him in 
a future campaign). 
 223. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 224. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(6) (2010) (providing a two-
level increase for the use of a computer). 
 225. See 141 CONG. REC. 10,280 (1995) (statement of Rep. Gilman) (“From mail order 
services to computer access, child pornographers are finding it easier to distribute their illegal 
materials.”); Michael M. O’Hear, Perpetual Panic, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 69, 74 (2008) 
(observing that “the sex crime panic was reenergized by . . . the increasingly pervasive presence 
of the Internet,” which “brought an unprecedented ease of access to” child pornography).  
 226. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 227. SCACPA § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 994 note (2006). 
 228. Stabenow, supra note 6, at 15–16. 
 229. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: SEX OFFENSES AGAINST 
CHILDREN: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING FEDERAL PENALTIES 29 (1996), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/SCAC.pdf. 
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B.  The Severity of the Guideline and Congressional Punitiveness 
More importantly, congressional amendments to the child 
pornography Guideline exemplify the institutional pathologies that 
bias the legislative process in favor of excessively harsh penalties. 
Consequently, a district court should decline to defer to the child 
pornography Guideline when it judges that Guideline to be too 
severe. 
The imbalance of political influence between users of child 
pornography and those favoring harsh punishments is great enough 
that Congress has probably attached no weight to the interests of the 
former group. Those who can reasonably anticipate being convicted 
of child pornography offenses in federal court are few enough that 
members of Congress need not be concerned about their voting 
power. In 2009, fewer than 1,700 cases were sentenced under Section 
2G2.2.230 As a result, there is probably no significant voting bloc of 
people who fear being subjected to harsh penalties for child 
pornography offenses. Further, hostility toward users of child 
pornography is sufficiently widespread and virulent that they have no 
hope of gaining the sympathy of any broader segment of the 
electorate.231 Members of Congress need not fear that child 
pornography offenders’ interests will be asserted at the ballot box. 
Moreover, the interest groups influential enough to gain access 
to the legislative process have overwhelmingly supported increased 
sentences. When Senator Helms introduced the Helms-Thurmond 
Amendment, he noted the support of the DOJ, as well as a number of 
anti-pornography groups.232 Notably absent is any recitation of the 
views of any opposing interest group.233 Admittedly, the House debate 
mentioned the Commission’s opposition to the Helms-Thurmond 
 
 230. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 111, at 36. 
 231. See PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 
4 (2001) (“Since child pornography first entered the public consciousness in the mid-1970s, any 
involvement with such materials has commonly been regarded as an extreme and unforgivable 
form of deviance. Many other forms of deviant behavior have their reputable defenders or at 
least libertarians who assert that these activities should not be severely penalized . . . . For child 
pornography, however, there is no such tolerance . . . .”). 
 232. 137 CONG. REC. 18,898 (1991) (statement of Sen. Helms). The Congressional Record 
also reproduces several letters from antipornography and child-advocacy groups, as well as the 
DOJ. 137 CONG. REC. 18,899–906 (1991). 
 233. The only possible exception is Helms’s conjecture that the ACLU would ask, “What is 
the big deal with pornography?” 137 CONG. REC. 18,898 (1991) (statement of Sen. Helms). 
WOODLEE IN FINAL 12/29/2010  5:32:42 PM 
1050 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1015 
Amendment.234 But any influence that the Commission might have 
had was probably outmatched by the support of numerous religious 
leaders,235 who could presumably mobilize public opinion against any 
official who might oppose their desired policy. 
The Feeney Amendment is an especially forceful illustration of 
the influence wielded by interest groups that favor harsh penalties. 
The DOJ originally drafted the provision; Representative Feeney 
later admitted that he had only been the “messenger.”236 Hearings—
potential forums for voices of opposition—were never held.237 Neither 
the Judicial Conference nor the Commission had the opportunity to 
offer their criticisms of the proposal238 before Representative Feeney 
introduced it in the House.239 Although their opposition was discussed 
in the Senate floor debate,240 the popularity of the Amber Alert bill to 
which the Feeney Amendment was attached had already made 
enactment a fait accompli.241 Thus, the body responsible for 
prosecuting child pornography crimes dominated the legislative 
process.242 
Even if the Feeney Amendment represents an exceptional case 
of the DOJ’s influence, more extraordinary still is the fact that so 
august a figure as Chief Justice Rehnquist would take the side of child 
pornography users in the dispute over the legislation.243 The Feeney 
 
 234. 137 CONG. REC. 23,732–34 (1991). 
 235. See id. at 23,732 (statement of Rep. Wolf) (listing religious groups that supported the 
Helms-Thurmond Amendment). 
 236. Phillips, supra note 97, at 983 & n.185 (citing Cohen & Fields, supra note 97). 
 237. 149 CONG. REC. 9347–48 (2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 238. Both opposed the Feeney Amendment. See 149 CONG. REC. 9351–52 (2003) 
(reproducing letters expressing the objections of the Judicial Conference and the Commission). 
 239. See id. at 9351 (reproducing a letter from the Judicial Conference complaining, after 
the Feeney Amendment passed the House, that “[n]either the Judicial Conference nor the 
Sentencing Commission has been given a fair opportunity to consider and comment on this 
proposal”); Phillips, supra note 97, at 986–87 (“The DOJ did not notify or consult with the 
Sentencing Commission in advance of the introduction of the Feeney Amendment in the 
House.”). 
 240. 149 CONG. REC. 9347 (2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 241. See Phillips, supra note 97, at 985 (“[A]ttaching . . . the Feeney Amendment to the 
AMBER Alert bill made it difficult for those legislators who opposed [the Feeney 
Amendment] . . . to oppose [the bill as a whole].”). 
 242. See Emily Bazelon, Op-Ed., With No Sentencing Leeway, What’s Left to Judge?, WASH. 
POST, May 4, 2003, at B4 (“A group of prosecutors in U.S. attorneys’ offices and the 
Department of Justice pushed to get the Feeney amendment through Congress . . . . The unified 
opposition of judges appointed by both Republicans and Democrats counted for little because 
prosecutors have much more political clout.”). 
 243. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a letter to Senator Leahy expressing the Judicial 
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Amendment’s broadly sweeping provisions that limited judicial 
discretion galvanized opposition from judges.244 Similarly, the 
Commission apparently acted out of apprehension that the Feeney 
Amendment would upset the institutional structure established by the 
SRA.245 Presumably less worrisome to both were the provisions 
raising the penalties for child pornography offenders.246 The interests 
of judges, the Commission, and child pornography users coincided 
only by chance.247 Thus, the fervent opposition to the Feeney 
Amendment—as ineffectual as it turned out to be—was not a typical 
response to legislation increasing penalties for child pornography 
offenders. Normally, child pornography offenders have no strong 
advocate in Congress.248 
Another source of potentially unwarranted severity is that 
congressional responses to child pornography have been designed to 
satisfy—or perhaps to inflame—public fears stemming from an 
exaggerated perception of the danger of child pornography, as well as 
the more general problem of sex crimes involving children.249 
 
Conference’s opposition to the Feeney Amendment. 149 CONG. REC. 9351 (2003). The Chief 
Justice’s opposition also received press coverage, e.g., Cohen & Fields, supra note 97; 
Greenhouse, supra note 172, and was the source of some unease about the Feeney Amendment 
in the Senate, see 149 CONG. REC. 9365 (2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (citing Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s “serious reservations” as evidence that the Feeney Amendment was flawed). 
 244. Charles Lane, Rehnquist Decries Sentencing Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2004, at A2; Ian 
Urbina, New York’s Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at 
B1. 
 245. See 149 CONG. REC. 9352 (2003) (reprinting a letter from the Commission arguing that 
“an issue of such magnitude” called for a more deliberative process that would include the 
preparation of a report to Congress by the Commission). 
 246. Both the Commission and the Judicial Conference opposed the practice of direct 
congressional amendments to the Guidelines, but neither expressed concern about increased 
penalties for child pornography offenses. Id. at 9351–52; see also id. at 9352–53 (reprinting the 
Commission’s letter objecting that the Feeney Amendment “alter[s] the traditional way in 
which guideline revisions are implemented”). 
 247. The broad sweep of the Feeney Amendment also led a perhaps surprising variety of 
interest groups to take the same side. See Materials from Interested Groups Opposing Original 
Feeney Amendment, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 346, 350, 353–54 (2003) (reprinting letters and press 
releases from, among others, the NAACP, the National Petroleum Refinery Association, and 
Business Civil Liberties, Inc. criticizing the Feeney Amendment). There is little reason to expect 
such groups to mobilize against legislation that focuses more narrowly on penalties for child 
pornography offenders. 
 248. For an example of a case in which interest groups lined up in favor of harsher penalties, 
see supra text accompanying notes 232–35. 
 249. See Basbaum, supra note 6, at 1292–94 (arguing that the child pornography Guideline is 
the result of a “moral panic”); see also Adler, supra note 220, at 233 (describing the mounting 
public alarm about the supposedly increasing prevalence of child pornography during the late 
1980s, even though “some critics maintain that the vigilance persisted without cause”). 
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Congress’s punitive approach to child pornography reflects spillover 
from public anxiety about contact offenses against children. 
Committee reports and statements from floor debates on child 
pornography legislation abound with invocations of the frightful 
specter of the child molester, who is thought to use child pornography 
to “stimulate[ his] sexual appetite[]” and to entice his victims.250 One 
striking, but hardly extraordinary, statement in the floor debate on a 
measure targeting child pornography warned of “child predators who 
lurk in every American community, armed with items of child 
pornography.”251 
The supposed link between possession of child pornography and 
physical child abuse is uncertain.252 It is not clear that child 
pornography leads its consumers to abuse children.253 Admittedly, 
 
 250. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 3 (2003) (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 12–14 (1996)); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 20 (1998) (“Law enforcement experts have testified before the 
Subcommittee on Crime that those who possess large quantities of child pornography are 
frequently child sex offenders and use such material to lure children into sexual encounters.”); 
149 CONG. REC. 9345 (2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[The bill] will protect our children 
from vicious criminals, pornographers, sexual abusers, and kidnappers. These types of 
individuals who prey on our Nation’s youth are nothing less than the scum of the earth . . . .”); 
137 CONG. REC. 18,898 (1991) (statement of Sen. Helms) (“[T]his amendment increases the 
sentences for smut peddlers convicted of transportation, receipt, or possession of child 
pornography.”). 
 251. 144 CONG. REC. 12,047 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bachus). 
 252. See Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing: Empirical 
Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 34–
48), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1689507 (reviewing 
empirical evidence and finding insufficient support for a link between possession of child 
pornography and contact offenses against children); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child 
Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 
24–28), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1577961 (same); 
Basbaum, supra note 6, at 1294–98 (same). For an overview of the limited empirical literature 
on the connection between child pornography and child sex abuse, see Neil Malamuth & Mark 
Huppin, Drawing the Line on Virtual Child Pornography: Bringing the Law in Line with the 
Research Evidence, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 773, 790–806 (2007). 
 253. See supra note 252. After surveying the empirical literature, Professors Neil Malamuth 
and Mark Huppin conclude that “evidence does not support the proposition that there is a 
strong connection between being a child pornography offender and committing sexual 
molestation,” but that “if a person has committed a child sex offense, then the use of 
pornography may constitute an additional risk factor for re-offending.” Malamuth & Huppin, 
supra note 252, at 820. In a more recent study, researchers studied a sample of child 
pornography users, of whom only 1 percent had previously committed a known contact offense, 
and found that “only 1% were charged with a subsequent hands-on sex offense in the 6 year 
follow-up [period].” Jérôme Endrass, Frank Urbaniok, Lea C. Hammermeister, Christian Benz, 
Thomas Elbert, Arja Laubacher & Astrid Rossegger, The Consumption of Internet Child 
Pornography and Violent and Sex Offending, 9 BMC PSYCHIATRY 43 (2009), http://www.bio
medcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-244X-9-43.pdf. The researchers concluded that consumption 
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there are other justifications for punishing the possession of child 
pornography. Consumption of child pornography may fuel a market 
for material that can only be produced by abusing children.254 
Furthermore, widespread possession of child pornography may 
exacerbate the psychological harm to the victims whose abuse that 
pornography depicts.255 But the harsh congressional response to child 
pornography has evidently drawn significant strength from—and 
perhaps exploited—public fears arising from the questionable 
assumption that those who possess child pornography are themselves 
likely to be contact offenders. Indeed, public anxiety about child 
molestation itself reflects a distorted perception of the prevalence of 
the problem.256 Thus, Congress’s response to the problem of child 
pornography has probably exceeded even the demands of 
majoritarian interests. 
In this context, the institutional perspective of district courts can 
play a useful balancing role. Confronted with the “human realities of 
sentencing,”257 and with the advocacy of defense counsel, district 
courts are less likely than Congress to discount offenders’ interests. 
Because district courts must focus their attention on the 
dangerousness of individual defendants, they are also less likely to be 
swayed by the hyperbolic generalizations about sex offenders that 
distort public opinion. Given these unique institutional strengths, 
district courts should have the discretion to impose below-Guidelines 
sentences for possession of child pornography when they judge the 
applicable Guideline to be too severe. 
 
of child pornography is not a predictor of future contact offenses among those with no previous 
contact offenses. Id. 
 254. Indeed, criminal prohibitions against possession of child pornography survive First 
Amendment scrutiny in large part because of the government’s interest in eliminating the 
market for the material. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1990) (“It is . . . surely 
reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the production of child pornography if 
it penalizes those who possess and view the product, thereby decreasing demand.”). 
 255. See id. at 111 (“[T]he materials produced by child pornographers permanently record 
the victim’s abuse. The pornography’s continued existence causes the child victims continuing 
harm by haunting the children in years to come.”). 
 256. See PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER 
IN MODERN AMERICA 7 (1998) (describing a cycle of increasing panic in which “[i]t comes to be 
believed that legions of sex fiends . . . stalk the land [and] that child pornography is an industry 
raking in billions of dollars and preying on hundreds of thousands of American youngsters every 
year”). 
 257. Berman, supra note 20, at 110. 
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C.  The Tradeoffs of Expansive Judicial Discretion 
Although allowing district courts significant discretion to impose 
below-Guidelines sentences in child pornography cases may serve as 
a useful check on some of the institutional pathologies that tend to 
result in excessively harsh sentencing legislation, this discretion has 
disadvantages. Two criticisms, in particular, warrant discussion. Both 
are serious. Neither, however, is fatal to this Note’s suggested 
approach to the child pornography Guideline. 
First, despite the benefits associated with federal judges’ 
insulation from electoral politics,258 it may seem unacceptably 
antidemocratic for district courts to refuse to defer to clearly 
expressed congressional policy judgments.259 But district courts may 
refuse to defer to those congressional policies only because Congress 
has expressed those policies through the advisory Guidelines. If 
Congress concludes that district courts are sentencing child 
pornography offenders too leniently, it can enact mandatory 
minimums.260 The threat of a more forceful congressional intervention 
in sentencing thus serves as a democratic check that can keep 
sentences from venturing too far from public preferences.261 A 
 
 258. See supra Part III.B. 
 259. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Priester, Apprendi Land Becomes Bizarro World: “Policy 
Nullification” and Other Surreal Doctrines in the New Constitutional Law of Sentencing 47–48 
(Mar. 28, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1577243 (“[O]n matters of non-constitutional law, the role of the courts is to 
interpret and apply the policies adopted by the legislature or executive branch enforcement 
authorities, lest they substituted the views of unelected judges for the policy judgments of the 
political branches.”). 
 260. Congress is hardly unfamiliar with the use of mandatory minimums. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251(e) (2006) (prescribing mandatory minimums for offenses involving the sexual 
exploitation of a child); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006) (prescribing mandatory minimums for drug 
offenses). For a list of federal statutes prescribing mandatory minimum sentences, see U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF STATUTORY MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING app. 
A (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/MANMIN/man_min.pdf. Perhaps less realistically, 
there are also a number of ways in which Congress could restore the mandatory status of at least 
some elements of the Guidelines. See Berman, supra note 50, at 356–71 (analyzing and 
critiquing possible legislative responses to Booker). 
 261. Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 92–93 (1982) 
(suggesting that judicial lawmaking might be legitimate in part because “judge-made 
rules . . . are subject to legislative or popular revision,” but noting that an additional argument is 
necessary to explain why judges should be able to make such provisional law in the first place); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil 
Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 642–61 (1991) (developing and applying a positive political 
theory model predicting that the Supreme Court will interpret statutes to conform to its policy 
preferences to the extent that it can be confident of avoiding a legislative override). 
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common criticism of this type of argument is that institutional inertia 
makes a congressional response unlikely.262 But as this Note’s analysis 
suggests, there are usually relatively few political obstacles to 
legislation ensuring harsher criminal penalties, particularly for child 
pornography offenders.263 Thus, the possibility of legislative override 
may provide a stronger check in this context than in many others. 
Second, allowing district courts to impose below-Guidelines 
sentences based on their own conclusions that the child pornography 
Guideline is too harsh would threaten uniformity in sentencing.264 
Admittedly, eliminating unwarranted disparity in sentencing was a 
central purpose of the SRA.265 As the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged, however, some disparity is a “necessary cost” of the 
constitutional remedy the Court adopted in Booker.266 More 
fundamentally, as the structure of § 3553(a) suggests, uniformity is 
 
 262. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
1479, 1524 (1987) (“[T]he possibility of legislative correction is not a true majoritarian check 
because it is not regularly invoked. Political theory and experience suggest that because of the 
many procedural obstacles to legislation in our bicameral committee-dominated Congress[ and] 
the tendency of interest groups to block rather than advance legislation . . . such legislative 
correction will rarely occur.”); cf. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom 
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983) (arguing that the modern 
constitutional avoidance canon creates constitutional “penumbra[s]” that function as 
prohibitions because “Congress’s practical ability to overrule a judicial decision misconstruing 
one of its statutes . . . is less today than ever before, and probably was never very great”). 
 263. See supra Parts III.B, IV.B. 
 264. See Bibas et al., supra note 154, at 1389 (voicing concern that authorizing district courts 
to deviate from the Guidelines based on their own policy views will result in “greater dispersion 
of sentences due solely to judges’ varying policy preferences”); Priester, supra note 259, at 41 
(“[I]f policy nullification is legitimate at the level of each sentencing judge, then the 
proliferation of such divergences is inevitable.”); see also Kevin Clancy, John Bartolomeo, 
David Richardson & Charles Wellford, Sentence Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence 
Decisions and the Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524, 
552 (1981) (finding that sentences varied according to judges’ views about the relative 
importance of various goals of sentencing and about the success of the criminal justice system in 
achieving those goals); Brian Forst & Charles Wellford, Punishment and Sentencing: Developing 
Sentencing Guidelines Empirically from Principles of Punishment, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 799, 811 
(1981) (finding that judges who regarded general deterrence, special deterrence, and 
incapacitation as important goals of sentencing imposed harsher sentences than judges who did 
not). But see Alexander Bunin, Reducing Sentencing Disparity by Increasing Judicial Discretion, 
22 FED. SENT’G REP. 81, 83 (2009) (arguing that under the advisory Guidelines, “[j]udges can 
now avoid both unwarranted disparity and unwarranted uniformity” because they can consider 
relevant factors neglected by the Guidelines). 
 265. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 65 (1984) (“The shameful disparity in criminal sentences is a 
major flaw in the existing criminal justice system, and makes it clear that the system is ripe for 
reform.”). 
 266. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 574 (2007). 
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only one goal of sentencing.267 Although district courts must consider 
the need to avoid unwarranted disparity,268 they should not pursue 
uniformity to the exclusion of other goals such as parsimony and 
proportionality.269 A system that imposed uniformly excessive 
sentences would hardly be an ideal one.270 Judicial discretion to 
deviate from the child pornography Guideline may sacrifice some 
uniformity but can also provide a valuable check on institutional 
pathologies that threaten to skew the Guidelines in favor of 
unnecessarily harsh penalties. 
CONCLUSION 
Although many early proponents of sentencing reform 
envisioned a politically insulated Commission that would formulate 
guidelines based on empirical study, courts must face the reality that 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines often reflect the influence of 
legislative politics. That influence is not all bad. Sentencing involves 
making value judgments about the seriousness of criminal conduct, as 
well as balancing society’s interests in public safety against the costs 
of punitive measures. Consequently, Congress’s democratic 
legitimacy and capacity for deliberation can potentially make its 
contributions to sentencing decisions valuable. On the other hand, 
Congress suffers from institutional pathologies that can lead it to 
disregard the harm caused by excessively harsh penalties. Courts 
should pay careful attention to these influences when the Guidelines 
reflect extensive congressional intervention. 
 
 267. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (requiring sentencing courts to consider several factors 
alongside the need to avoid unwarranted disparity). 
 268. Id. § 3553(a)(6). 
 269. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (imposing the parsimony requirement and requiring that the 
sentence imposed “reflect the seriousness of the offense”); see also Michael M. O’Hear, The 
Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 249, 249 (2005) (“No matter how attractive 
uniformity might be in theory, we should not exalt uniformity to the detriment of other 
important objectives . . . .”). 
 270. Furthermore, the notion that deviation from the Guidelines threatens the goal of 
uniformity rests in part on the assumption that “adherence to the Guidelines . . . actually 
advances uniformity goals in a robust fashion.” O’Hear, supra note 269, at 249. That assumption 
is not universally accepted. See, e.g., id. at 250–53 (arguing that the Guidelines “do not embody 
a robust system of sentencing uniformity” and that consequently, “questions about the 
desirability of judicial adherence to the Guidelines as they exist cannot usefully be equated with 
questions about the desirability of uniformity in sentencing as an abstract proposition”); cf. 
Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 (1997) 
(arguing that the Guidelines lack “a coherent underlying theory of punishment,” which is 
necessary to give meaning to the goal of “reducing sentencing disparity”). 
WOODLEE IN FINAL 12/29/2010  5:32:42 PM 
2011] CHILD PORNOGRAPHY SENTENCING 1057 
The child pornography Guideline illustrates the dangers of 
congressional intervention in the Commission’s policymaking process. 
Although that Guideline may reflect legitimate public concern about 
the problem of child pornography, it also reflects the political 
system’s structural bias in favor of harsher penalties, as well as 
passions inflamed by a cloudy public perception of the broader 
problem of sex offenses against children. In light of these problems, 
courts can provide a valuable balancing perspective. By exercising 
independent judgment about whether the child pornography 
Guideline is too harsh, district courts can impose a vital check on 
forces that skew congressional sentencing policy toward unwarranted 
severity. 
